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QUESTION PRESENTED
Five major federal employment statutes, includ-
ing in this case the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, exclude certain government workers "at the
policymaking level" from the definition of employees
protected by those laws. The question presented is:
who is a worker "on the policymaking level"?
ii
PARTIES
The petitioners are Christine A. Opp, Edward J.
Barrett, and Leonard Cahnmann.
The respondents are the Office of the State’s
Attorney of Cook County, Illinois, Cook County itself,
Richard A. Devine, individually and in his official
capacity as State’s Attorney of Cook County, Illinois,
and Anita Alvarez, individually and in her official
capacity as State’s Attorney of Cook County, Illinois.*
* At the time when the petitioners were discharged Mr.
Devine was the State’s Attorney. Ms. Alvarez is the current
State’s Attorney.
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Petitioners Christine A. Opp, Edward J. Barrett,
and Leonard Cahnmann, respectfully pray that this
Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the judg-
ment and opinion of the United States Court of Ap-
peals entered on December 29, 2010.
OPINIONS BELOW
The December 29, 2010 opinion of the Court of
Appeals, which is reported at 630 F.2d 616 (7th
Cir.2010), is set out at pp. 1a-lla of the Appendix.
The October 8, 2009 memorandum opinion and order
of the District Court in Opp v. Office of the State’s
Attorney of Cook County, which is reported at 660
F.Supp.2d 932 (N.D.Ill. 2009), is set out at pp. 12a-
16a of the Appendix. The October 22, 2009 decision of
the District Court in Barrett v. Cook County State’s
Attorney Office, which is not reported, is set out at pp.
17a-23a of the Appendix. The December 11, 2009,
memorandum opinion and order of the District Court
in Cahnmann v. Devine, which is unofficially reported
at 2009 WL 4884168 (N.D.Ill.), is set out at pp. 24a-
32a of the Appendix. The appeals of the district court
decisions in Opp, Barrett and Cahnmann were re-
solved in the December 29, 2010 Court of Appeals
opinion.
2STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered
on December 29, 2010. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
The statutory provision involved is set out in the
Appendix.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Five major federal employment statutes, includ-
ing in the instant case the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, exclude certain government work-
ers "at the policymaking level" from the definition of
employees protected by those laws. Since 1993 the
Seventh Circuit has applied a uniquely broad inter-
pretation of this exclusion, construing the exclusion
far more expansively than the avowedly narrow
construction in other circuits. In the instant case the
Seventh Circuit expressly refused to reconsider its
interpretation of this exclusion, and emphatically
rejected the narrower construction of the exclusion
adopted by the Second Circuit. (Pet. App. 6a-7a). This
case provides an ideal vehicle for resolving this
deeply entrenched conflict.
The complaints in this case concern layoffs that
occurred in March 2007 at the Cook County State’s
Attorney’s Office. That office is the second largest
prosecutor’s office in the nation; it employs approxi-
mately 900 attorneys, who are referred to as assistant
state’s attorneys.1 The State’s Attorney’s Office is
organized into seven bureaus with more than 50
subsidiary divisions or units. Employees of the State’s
Attorney’s Office work at offices in about eleven
different locations.
Plaintiffs Opp, Barrett and Cahnmann worked in
separate, unrelated offices. Opp and Barrett were
prosecutors in the Sixth and Fourth Districts, respec-
tively. Cahnmann worked in the Real Estate Tax
section, which is part of the Civil Actions Bureau.
None of the plaintiffs were (or had ever been) in
charge of a Bureau or any of the 50 subsidiary sec-
tions.
In early 2007, three plaintiffs were notified, at
separate meetings, that they were being laid off as of
March 2, 2007. All of the plaintiffs were then above
the age of 40. Each was informed that his or her
dismissal was the result of "a reduction in the work-
force due to budgetary cuts," and that he or she had
been selected for dismissal in light of the "future
needs of the office.’’2 Within a few months of these
1 http://www, statesattorney.org/index2/about_the_office.html
(visited February 20, 2011).
2 Opp First Amended Complaint, pp. 5-6; Barrett First
Amended Complaint, p. 5; Cahnmann First Amended Com-
plaint, p. 4.
4layoffs, however, the State’s Attorney’s office hired a
large number of new, younger attorneys, and gave
substantial raises to the attorneys who had not been
dismissed. Around May 1, 2007 the State’s Attorney’s
office began hiring new attorneys, and had hired a
total of approximately 70 additional attorneys by the
end of the year; all of the new hires were considerably
younger than the plaintiffs. In May or July 2007, the
attorneys in the State’s Attorney’s office were award-
ed raises of $6,000 to $12,000. In August 2007 those
attorneys were awarded an additional 8% raise,
retroactive to December 2004, and as well as further
raises totalling 4.75% over the course of the succeed-
ing ten months.3
Each of the plaintiffs filed an individual com-
plaint alleging that he or she had been laid off on the
basis of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. The complaints asserted that the
plaintiffs were not within the categories of employees
excluded from the protections of the ADEA; Opp and
Barrett specifically asserted they were not "appoin-
tee[s] on the policy making level.’’4
The defendants moved to dismiss all three com-
plaints. Those motions contended that the plaintiffs
~ Opp First Amended Complaint, pp. 7-8; Barrett First
Amended Complaint, p. 7; Cahnmann First Amended Com-
plaint, p. 4.
40pp First Amended Complaint p. 9; Barrett First Amend-
ed Complaint, p. 9; Cahnmann First Amended Complaint, p. 5.
5were excluded from the protections of the ADEA
because they were not "employee[s]" as that term is
defined in section ll(f) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f).
Defendants argued that each of the plaintiffs was "an
appointee on the policymaking level" and thus outside
the protection of the Act. Section ll(f) excludes such
policymaking level officials from the definition of a
covered "employee" if the official was appointed by an
elected official and is not subject to state or local civil
service laws.
Defendants did not contend that Opp, Barrett or
Cahnmann were high ranking officials with the
authority to issue binding rules, regulations or
standards. Nor did the defendants argue that any of
the plaintiffs worked closely with, or had ever even
met, the State’s Attorney himself. Rather, relying on
the Seventh Circuit’s sweeping interpretation of the
policymaker exception to the ADEA and other similar
federal statutes, the defendants asserted that all
Illinois assistant state’s attorneys, including all 900
of the Cook County Assistant State’s Attorneys, were
"at the policymaking level" within the meaning of
section 11(f).
[A]n assistant State’s Attorney is not an ’em-
ployee’ as defined by the ADEA .... [T]he law
in this circuit is unambiguous regarding this
issue. As an assistant state’s attorney, Plain-
tiff was "an appointee on the policy making
6level" ... and was not an "employee" for pur-
poses of the ADEA.~
Defendants acknowledged that their interpretation of
the policymaking level exemption
would leave thousands of Assistant State’s
Attorneys outside the scope of the ADEA, ...
[because] under precedent from the Seventh
Circuit, Assistant State’s Attorneys are ex-
empt from protection of the ADEA.~
Under Seventh Circuit precedent, they urged, the
actual duties assigned to any given assistant state’s
attorney were "wholly irrelevant.’’~
In separate opinions the district judges in Opp,
Barrett, and Cahnmann, applying controlling Seventh
Circuit precedent, dismissed the complaints on the
grounds advanced by the defendants. Those courts
held, first, that under those precedents the standard
to be used in determining whether an individual is at
the policymaking level under the ADEA (or other
similar federal statutes), and thus unprotected by
federal law, is the First Amendment standard that
5 Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s 12(b)(6) Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Opp v. The
Office of the State’s Attorney of Cook County, pp. 2, 6.
6 Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, Opp v. The Office of the State’s Attorney of Cook County,
p. 2.
7 Id. at 5.
7governs whether a government worker can be dis-
missed because of his or her political affiliation. "The
test for determining whether an employee is exempt
from the ADEA is the same test for determining
whether they are exempt from the patronage ban."
(Pet. App. 7a n.1). Although the First Amendment
generally forbids discriminating against government
employees on the basis of party affiliation, certain
government workers can be dismissed (or hired)
because of their party affiliation. Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
Second, the District Courts applied the well
established Seventh Circuit rule that a worker is
unprotected under Branti and Elrod, and (thus)
outside the protections of the ADEA (and other simi-
larly worded statutes), if "the position held by the
individual authorizes, either directly or indirectly,
meaningful input into governmental decision-making
on issues where there is room for principled disa-
greement on goals or their implementation." (Pet.
App. 13a, 27a).
Based on these related Seventh Circuit prece-
dents, the district courts held that "as a matter of
law" an assistant state’s attorney is an appointee at
the "policymaking level." (Pet. App. 13a, 21a, 31a).
The district courts concluded that in Illinois every
assistant state’s attorney is a policymaker, and thus
unprotected by the ADEA, even if the individual was
"a low-level or apolitical [attorney]" (Pet. App. 31a)
(quoting DeRose v. Office of the State’s Attorney of
Cook County, 2009 WL 3839301 at *2 (N.D.Ill. Nov.
13, 2009)), and "regardless of their actual, day-to-day
job functions." (Pet. App. 14a).
On appeal the Seventh Circuit held that "all
Assistant State’s Attorneys are appointees on the
policymaking level and therefore are not within the
coverage of the ADEA." (Pet. App. 5a (emphasis
added); see id. at 10a ("the appellants’ positions as
Assistant State’s Attorneys gave them inherent
policymaking authority")).
The Seventh Circuit applied its longstanding rule
that in construing the exclusion in the ADEA and
similarly worded federal statutes
the test for determining if someone is an
"employee" ... is essentially indistinguishable
from that applied in the political firing con-
text under the Elrod/Branti doctrine.
(Pet. App. 6a) (quoting Americanos v. Carter, 74 F.3d
138, 144 (7th Cir.1996) (citing Heck v. City of Free-
port, 985 F.2d 305,310 (7th Cir.1993))).
Under the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of
Elrod and Branti, and thus under its construction of
the ADEA,
[a]n individual is considered an appointee on
the policymaking level if "the position held
by the individual authorizes, either directly
or indirectly, meaningful input into govern-
mental decision-making on issues where
there is room for principled disagreement on
goals or their implementation." Americanos
v. Carter, 74 F.3d 138, 141 (7th Cir.1996)
(quoting Heideman v. Wirsing, 7 F.3d 659,
663 (7th Cir.1993)).
(Pet. App. 5a).
Applying that well established Seventh Circuit
standard, the court of appeals explained, the mere
fact that a government lawyer had (or could be given)
the authority to "choose to prosecute or dismiss a case
... alone raises Assistant State’s Attorneys to the level
of policymakers." (Pet. App. 9a-10a) (emphasis add-
ed). The possibility that an Assistant State’s Attorney
might at some point try a case, for example, rendered
the lawyer a policymaker, regardless of whether his
or her actual job entailed no such responsibilities.
[A]ny arguments about their actual duties
are irrelevant, and we need not conduct a
factual analysis of the appellants’ actual job
duties.
(Pet. App. 10a).
The Seventh Circuit candidly acknowledged that
its interpretation of the policymaking level exemption
in the ADEA and other similarly worded federal
statutes was broader than the construction adopted
by the Second Circuit. The Court of Appeals below
10
expressly rejected that narrower Second
standard. (Pet. App. 6a-7a).
Circuit
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE SHARPLY
DIVIDED ABOUT THE SCOPE OF THE
POLICYMAKING LEVEL APPOINTEE EX-
CLUSION IN THE AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT ACT AND OTHER MA-
JOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT STATUTES
This case presents a well established and deeply
entrenched conflict about the scope of several im-
portant federal employment statutes. In essentially
identical language, five major federal employment
statutes exclude from their coverage certain employ-
ees at the "policymaking level." That exclusion ap-
plies to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act8, the Fair Labor
8 Section 701(f) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), provides
in pertinent part:
The term "employee" ... shall not include any person
elected to public office in any State or political subdi-
vision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or
any person chosen by such officer to be on such of-
ficer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy
making level or an immediate adviser with respect to
the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of
the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding
sentence shall not include employees subject to the
(Continued on following page)
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Standards Act9, the Equal Pay Act1°, and the Family
and Medical Leave Act.11 Each of these statutes
excludes workers at the "policymaking level" when
two other requirements are satisfied - the employees
must be appointed by an elected official, and the
employees must not be subject to applicable state or
local civil service laws.
The lower courts agree that the pivotal phrase
"policymaking level" has the same meaning in all five
of these statutes.12 (See Pet. 6a) ("ADEA/Title VII"
civil service laws of a State government, governmen-
tal agency, or political subdivision.
See Guy v. State of Illinois, 958 F.Supp. 1300 (N.D.Ill. 1997)
(policymaking level exclusion bars Title VII claim alleging
sexual harassment and retaliation).
9 Section 203(e)(2)(C) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C),
excludes from the definition of a covered employee an individual
"appointed by ... an [elected] officeholder to serve on a policy-
making level" if he or she is not subject to state or local govern-
ment civil service laws.
lo The Equal Pay Act applies to employees and employers
subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Birch v. Cuyahoga
County Probate Court, 392 F.3d 151 (6th Cir.2004) (policymaking
level exclusion bars Equal Pay Act claim).
11 The FMLA incorporates by reference the definition of
employee in the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3); see O’Reilly v.
Montgomery County, 2003 WL 23101795 (S.D.Ind. Feb. 24, 2003)
(policymaking level exclusion bars FMLA claim).
12 E.g., EEOC v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 858 F.2d
52, 55-56 (lst Cir. 1988) (relying on legislative history of Title VII
exclusion to interpret the ADEA); Butler v. New York State
Department of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 747 (2d Cir.2000) ("We ... rely
on the analysis of the definition of employee from our previous
ADEA cases for Butler’s Title VII claim").
12
test). The courts of appeals are sharply divided,
however, as to the meaning of "policymaking" in these
federal laws.
Since its 1993 decision in Heck v. City of Freeport,
985 F.3d 305 (7th Cir.1993), the Seventh Circuit has
applied a uniquely broad interpretation of the exclu-
sion in these federal statutes. The Seventh Circuit’s
construction of the statutory exclusion is avowedly
based, not on the text or purpose of the statutes
themselves, but instead on that Circuit’s interpreta-
tion of this Court’s First Amendment decisions in
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) and Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). Numerous circuits, and
the highest court of one state, have adopted far
narrower interpretations of the statutory exclusion,
interpretations which instead rely in particular on
the legislative history of that exclusion. There are
significant differences among these courts as well.
In the instant case the Seventh Circuit expressly
rejected the Second Circuit’s narrower interpretation
of the exclusion (Pet. App. 6ao7a); the Second Circuit,
in turn, has expressly rejected the Seventh Circuit’s
construction applied in this case. (See p. 19, infra).
Am The Seventh Circuit Has Adopted A
Uniquely Expansive Interpretation of
The Policymaking Level Appointee Ex-
clusion
As the court below correctly observed, "[t]h[e]
Seventh [C]ircuit’s case law regarding the interpretation
13
of an appointee on the policymaking level is well-
established." (Pet. App. 5a). Since 1993 the Seventh
Circuit has held that the legal standard governing
which workers are at the "policymaking level" within
the meaning of the exemption in the ADEA and other
similarly worded federal statutes is determined by
applying the First Amendment standard for deter-
mining, under Elrod and Branti, which workers are
"policymakers" who can be dismissed on the basis of
party affiliation. (Pet. App. 6a) (quoting Americanos v.
Carter, 74 F.3d 138, 144 (7th Cir.1996) (citing Heck v.
City of Freeport, 985 F.2d 305, 310 (7th Cir.1993))).
Since 1981 the Seventh Circuit has adhered to a
uniquely sweeping interpretation of when under
Elrod and Branti a government worker can be fired
because he or she belongs to the wrong political party.
The test is whether the position held by the
individual authorizes, either directly or indi-
rectly, meaningful input into governmental
decisionmaking on issues where there is
room for principled disagreement on goals or
their implementation.
Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1170 (7th
Cir.1981). The decision in the instant case utilizing
that standard is the fifteenth occasion on which the
Seventh Circuit has applied the standard established
by Nekolny. (Pet. App. 5a) (quoting Americanos v.
Carter, 74 F.3d 138, 141 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting
14
Heideman v. Wirsing, 7 F.3d 659, 663 (7th
Cir.1993))).13
The well established Seventh Circuit’s standard
applied in this case categorizes a worker as at the
policymaking level under the ADEA (and as a policy-
maker under Elrod and Branti) in three different
circumstances.
First, a decision is a policymaking decision in the
Seventh Circuit whenever the decision involves a
matter about which "there is room for principled
disagreement on goals or their implementation." (Pet.
App. 5a). As the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly
explained, the touchstone of policymaking in that
circuit is whether the person who made the decision
had discretion in the choice. An individual acts as a
non-policymaker only when his or her actions are
simply ministerial. "Those vested with significant
discretionary authority, as opposed to ministerial
duties, are easily identified." Heideman v. Wirsing, 7
F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir.1993). "[A]n employee who
performs primarily ministerial functions and who has
little autonomy or discretion in performing his duties"
is not a policymaker. Flenner v. Sheahan, 107 F.3d
459, 463 (7th Cir.1997); see Newcomb v. Brennan, 558
F.3d 825,830 (7th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff not protected by
First Amendment because he "cannot perform his job
by the simple exercise of ministerial competence").
13 Heideman in turn quotes Nekolny.
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So long as discretion exists, the choice of action is
"policymaking" even though the decision is made by a
low level employee and applies in only a single situa-
tion. Thus under the Seventh Circuit standard an
ordinary deputy sheriff "make[s] decisions that will
actually create policy" because "deputies on patrol ...
frequently work autonomously, giving them wide
latitude and discretion in the performance of their
duties." Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1215 (7th
Cir.1991) (emphasis added). In Vargas-Harrison v.
Racine Unified School District, 272 F.3d 964 (7th
Cir.2002), the Seventh Circuit held that an elemen-
tary school principal was a policymaker because she
"assisted in the selection, supervision and evaluation
of the faculty." 272 F.3d at 972-73. In the instant case
the Court of Appeals applied that standard in deter-
mining that assistant state’s attorneys are at "the
level of policymakers" if they have "the authority to
conduct a case in court" and "may choose to l~rosecute
or dismiss a case." (Pet. App. 9a-10a).
Second, even if an individual has no such author-
ity to make discretionary decisions, the worker is still
deemed to be at the policymaking level if he or she
has "meaningful input," "directly or indirectly," into
the discretionary (policymaking) decision of some
other official. (Pet. App. 5a). Thus in Vargas-Harrison
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff was
also a policymaker simply because she was author-
ized to "develop[ ] a grant proposal." 272 F.3d at 873.
"Although her superiors ultimately rejected the
proposal, ’the relevant inquiry is’ whether she had
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’input, not control.’" Id. (quoting Warzon v. Drew, 60
F.3d 1234, 1239 (7th Cir.1995)). Similarly, an ordi-
nary "research analyst" is a policymaker in the Sev-
enth Circuit if he or she has "meaningful input on
County policy by producing research on which the
Board of Supervisors would base its decisions." Bonds
v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 977 (7th
Cir.2000).TM In the instant case the Court of Appeals
held that an assistant state’s attorney is at the poli-
cymaking level because he or she "carries out policy
on behalf of the government, and in doing so has
’meaningful input .... ’" (Pet. App. 9a).
Third, in the Seventh Circuit an individual is a
policymaker even if he or she never in fact makes,
and never actually has any input into, a discretionary
decision, so long as "the position held by the individ-
ual authorizes" the assignment of such tasks. (Pet.
App. 5a). If a worker’s position would permit
14 In Levin v. Madigan, 2008 WL 4287778 (N.D.Illo Sept. 12,
2008), the District Court held that under Seventh Circuit
precedent a lawyer is at the policymaking level under (and thus
unprotected by) the ADEA and Title VII if he "could potentially
influence policy making by providing his supervisors with
research .... [E]ven if Plaintiff in this case had little independent
authority, ... he could potentially influence policy." 2008 WL
4287778 at *4. In O’Reilly v. Newman, 2003 WL 23101795 at *10
(S.D.Ind. Feb. 24, 2003), the District Court held that under
Seventh Circuit precedent a probation officer is at the policy-
making level under (and thus unprotected by) Title VII and the
Family Medical Leave Act because a probation official provides
reports, information and recommendations which "the court
relies on in coming to important decisions."
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assigning him or her a policymaking task, the worker
is a policymaker even if no such assignments are ever
made. Regardless of what duties are actually given to
such a worker, he "may be authorized" to engage in
policymaking activity and thus "could potentially be
called upon to [do so]." Americanos, 74 F.3d at 141
(first emphasis added; second emphasis in original).
Thus an individual who could potentially be given
policymaking tasks is a policymaker in the Seventh
Circuit regardless of whether he or she is actually a
"witless paper pusher" who "never thought of think-
ing for himself at all." Hernandez v. O’Malley, 98 F.3d
293, 295 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting W.S. Gilbert, H.M.S.
Pinafore).
In the instant case the Court of Appeals insisted
that assistant state’s attorneys are inherently at the
policymaking level because
[u]nder Illinois law Assistant State’s Attor-
neys are surrogates for the State’s Attorney.
Assistant State’s Attorneys "possess the
power in the same manner and to the same
effect as the State’s Attorney."
(Pet. App. 9a) (quoting McGrath v. Gillis, 44 F.3d
567, 571 (7th Cir.1995)). Of course, the State’s Attor-
ney in this case had not actually delegated all of his
powers to the three plaintiffs; the plaintiffs were at
the "policymaking level" simply because their jobs
(unlike, for example, the job descriptions of a secre-
tary or computer technician) permitted the State’s
Attorney "potentially" to assign them any of his
policymaking powers. The Court of Appeals believed
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that a prosecutor’s decision "to prosecute or dismiss a
case" constitutes policymaking (Pet. App. 10a); the
Court of Appeals, however, did not suggest (and the
defendants had never claimed) that any of the plain-
tiffs in this case actually had the authority to make
such decisions.
Applying this body of Seventh Circuit precedent,
the court below concluded that the plaintiffs were at
the policymaking level regardless of whether each
held "a low-level position" in the office. (Pet. App 7a).
The District Court in Cahnmann also recognized that
under Seventh Circuit precedent even a "low-level"
government worker can be at the "policymaking level"
and thus outside the protections of the ADEA and
similarly worded federal statutes. (Pet. App. 31a)
(quoting DeRose v. Office of State’s Attorney of Cook
County, 2009 WL 3839301 at *2 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 13,
2009) (assistant state’s attorney is at the policymak-
ing level even if he or she is "a low-level" employee)).
B. Numerous Lower Courts Interpret The
Policymaking Level Appointee Exclu-
sion More Narrowly
The panel below expressly acknowledged that the
Seventh Circuit’s own interpretation of the policy-
making level appointee exemption conflicted with the
standard in other circuits.
The appellants urge this Court to overrule
Americanos and follow the approach of some
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other circuits, an invitation we decline to ac-
cept. Whereas this court relies on a single
test in determining whether an individual is
an appointee on the policymaking level, the
Second Circuit, for example, applies differing
approaches in First Amendment cases and in
ADEA/Title VII cases. Butler v. New York
State Dep’t of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 746-47 (2d
Cir.2000) (applying the Elrod/Branti doctrine
for a First Amendment analysis and drawing
on Title VII statutory language and Congres-
sional intent for a Title VII analysis). We
choose, however, not to draw a distinction be-
tween how aggrieved individuals are inter-
preted as policymakers under the First
Amendment and under the ADEA.
(Pet. App. 6a-7a). Most circuits have indeed adopted a
standard that is quite different from that utilized in
the Seventh Circuit.
(1) In Butler v. New York State Department of
Law, 211 F.3d 739 (2d Cir.2000), the Second Circuit
expressly rejected the Seventh Circuit rule that the
scope of the statutory exclusion of policymaking level
officials is the same as the category of officials denied
protection from patronage dismissals under Elrod
and Branti. In construing the policymaking level
exclusion in Title VII, Butler expressly disapproved
the very Seventh Circuit decision (Americanos) that
was relied on by the court below in the instant case.
Our analysis of Butler’s status as a policy-
maker for First Amendment purposes does
not control our title VII inquiry .... The
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Seventh Circuit has used a single test to re-
solve the policymaker question under both
the first Amendment and the employment
discrimination statutes. See Americanos v.
Carter .... We disagree with the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s approach. This Court’s First Amend-
ment analysis follows the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Elrod and Branti .... Our Title
VII analysis, by contrast, draws on the lan-
guage of the statute and congressional in-
tent.
211 F.3d at 746-47 (emphasis added).
Butler interpreted the policymaking exclusion in
an avowedly narrow manner that is contrary to the
expansive Seventh Circuit definition. First, the Second
Circuit held that the policymaking level exclusion
should be "construed narrowly" and is limited to
"policymaking positions at the highest levels of the
departments or agencies." 211 F.3d at 747 (quoting
EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 800 (2d Cir.1990)
(citing Tranello v. Frey, 962 F.2d 244, 249-50 (2d
Cir.1992)). In EEOC v. Vermont the Second Circuit
noted that Congress had pointed to "cabinet officers,
and persons with comparable responsibilities at the
local level" as the only category of officials deemed to
be at the policymaking level. 904 F.2d at 800.
Second, the Second Circuit requires a showing
that the appointees at issue "would normally work
closely with ... the official who appointed them."
Butler, 211 F.3d at 749 n.6 (emphasis in original)
(quoting EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 800).
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[B]oth the evolution of the exception and the
[congressional] direction that it be construed
narrowly support our interpretation that by
excluding appointees on the policymaking
level, Congress meant to deny ... protection
only to such appointees as would normally
work closely with and be accountable to the
official who appointed them.
211 F.3d at 748 (quoting Tranello, 962 F.2d at 250
(quoting EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 800)).
The conflict between the Second and Seventh
Circuit standards is highlighted by the divergent
results in similar cases.15 District Courts in the
Second Circuit have repeatedly held that lawyers in
a county attorney’s office - the position at issue in
the instant case - are not appointees at the policy-
making level. In Mareno v. County of Westchester,
1991 WL 340566 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1991), the dis-
trict court concluded that under Second Circuit
1~ In Americanos the Seventh Circuit held that attorneys in
a state Indiana Attorney General’s office are policymakers. 74
F.3d at 141-43.
On the other hand, in Simpson v. Vacco, 1998 WL 118155 at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. March 17, 1998), the District Court held that under
Second Circuit precedent attorneys in the New York Attorney
General’s office - essentially the same position which America-
nos held is within the policymaking exclusion to Title VII (and
the ADEA) - are not within the policymaker exclusion to Title
VII, explaining that "[t]he Second Circuit has held that a
policymaker exception for Title VII is to be construed very
narrowly [and] applies only to very few, high-level advisors to an
elected official, and not to low-level employees."
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precedent assistant county attorneys in New York
"are ... not the kind of executive policymakers which
Congress intended to exempt from the ADEA." at *4.
In Tranello v. Frey, 758 F.Supp. 841 (W.D.N.Y. 1991),
the District Court also held that an attorney assis-
tant to a County Attorney in New York is not a person
at the policymaking level "[i]n view of the narrow way
in which the policymaker exception has been inter-
preted by the Second Circuit." 758 F.Supp. at 850,
aff’d on other grounds, 962 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.1992).
The District Court in Tranello concluded that the
plaintiff was protected by the ADEA even though he
was not protected under Elrod and Branti.
The First Circuit imposes the same two require-
ments utilized by the Second Circuit. EEOC v. Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52 (1st
Cir.1988), agreed that the policymaking appointee
exemption in the ADEA is to be "construed narrowly,"
and limited to positions at "the highest levels of the
departments or agencies." 858 F.2d at 55. "[T]he
narrow construction mentioned by the conferees ... is
clearly intended to limit the reach of the exception
down the chain of command .... [T]he ... language
limited the positions covered to those at the highest
level." Id. at 56.
The First Circuit explained that exempted high
level appointees in executive agencies are ordinarily
the individuals who work closely with the elected
official who appointed them.
[A]ppointed policy makers in the highest
position of the legislative and executive
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branches of government generally do work
very closely with those [elected] officials who
have appointed them.
Id.; see EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 800 (exemption
is to be "construed narrowly" "to avoid casting the net
too widely"; "Congress meant to deny ADEA protec-
tion only to such appointees as would normally work
closely with and be accountable to the official who
appointed them").
The Tenth Circuit utilizes a standard similar to
that in the First and Second Circuits. In Crumpaker
v. Kansas Department of Human Resources, 474 F.3d
747 (10th Cir.2007), the Tenth Circuit concluded that
the policymaking exemption is limited to "policymak-
ing positions at the highest levels of the departments
or agencies of State or local governments, such as
cabinet officers, and persons with comparable respon-
sibilities at the local level." 474 F.3d at 752 (quoting
Joint Explanatory Statement of Managers at the
Conference on H.R. 1746, 1972 U.S.Code & Admin.
News 2137, 2179-80). In Anderson v. City of Albu-
querque, 690 F.2d 796 (10th Cir.1982), the Tenth
Circuit relied on that same legislative history in
concluding "that Congress intended the exemption to
be narrowly construed." 690 F.2d at 800. That "nar-
row exemption," the Tenth Circuit insisted, is limited
to appointees "who are in a close personal relation-
ship and an immediate relationship with [the ap-
pointing official]. Those who are his first line of
advisors." 690 F.2d at 801; see id. (plaintiff not within
the exemption because there was no "intimate ...
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association" between plaintiff and appointing official;
"immediate and personal relationship required").
(2) The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
construed the policymaking level appointee exclusion
in the ADEA to apply only to officials who establish
standards of general application, such as rules or
regulations, governing future actions. Stout v. Com-
monwealth, 521 Pa. 571, 559 A.2d 489 (1989).
The ... ADEA ... does not apply to " ... an ap-
pointee on the policymaking level .... " 29
U.S.C. § 630(f) .... "Policymaking" may be de-
fined as the act of elaborating policy ... , and
"policy" is defined as "a definite course or
method of action selected from among alter-
natives and in light of given conditions to
guide and determine present and future de-
cisions" or "a high-level overall plan embrac-
ing the general goals and acceptable
procedures, especially of a governmental
body." Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dic-
tionary, p. 910, 1985 Edition.
521 Pa. at 582-84; see id. at 585 ("supervision of the
judicial system," "general rules of procedure," "regu-
lations and directives"), 586 ("decisional law [that]
takes on a rulemaking quality," "charting a definite
course of action for the judiciary"). The Pennsylvania
interpretation of the policymaking level exemption is
clearly inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit start-
dard, and differs as well from the standard in the
First, Second and Tenth Circuits.
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(3) Four other circuits hold that the policymak-
ing level appointee exclusion is to be narrowly con-
strued. Curl v. Reavis, 740 F.2d 1323, 1328 (4th
Cir.1984) (quoting Joint Explanatory Statement that
exclusion is to be "construed narrowly"); Teneyuca v.
Bexar County, 767 F.2d 148, 152 (5th Cir.1985)
(same); Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County,
729 F.2d 541, 548-49 (8th Cir.1984) (same); Walton v.
State of Michigan, 1990 WL 182033 at *3 (6th Cir.)
(same). Although this requirement is less specific
than the standard in the First, Second and Tenth
Circuits, it assuredly precludes construing the statu-
tory exclusion to encompass every attorney in a 900
lawyer office.
(4) The Seventh Circuit’s exceptionally broad
view of which employees may be dismissed based on
political affiliation under Elrod and Branti, the
constitutional standard incorporated into the statu-
tory policymaking exemption and thus applied by the
court below, has been expressly rejected by the Elev-
enth Circuit.
Application of the Seventh Circuit’s broad test
has led to results far afield from Branti. In
Americanos v. Carter ... , for example, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that every Deputy
Attorney General in Indiana’s Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office was subject to patronage dis-
missal .... although Branti may permit the dis-
missal of the U.S. Attorney of a district and
some of his or her chief deputies, we believe
Branti would not permit the dismissal of all
Assistant U.S. Attorneys for patronage rea-
sons.
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Cutliffe v. Cochran, 117 F.3d 1353, 1359 n.4 (11th
Cir.1997) (emphasis in original). The Seventh Circuit
decision in the instant case, applying that Circuit’s
precedent to permit dismissal of all assistant prosecu-
tors on the basis of age, reaches precisely the result
disapproved by the Eleventh Circuit in Cutliffe. That
conflict is part of a widespread disagreement among
the courts of appeals regarding when Elrod and
Branti permit hiring and firing on the basis of party
affiliation; as Justice Scalia noted in Rutan v. Repub-
lican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990), the courts
of appeals "have devised various standards" and the
appellate decisions are in a "shambles." 497 U.S. at
111 (dissenting opinion).
(5) The leading Illinois appellate decision con-
strues the policymaking level exclusion in federal law
in the same narrow manner as the First, Second and
Tenth Circuits. In Office of the Lake County State’s
Attorney vo Human Rights Commission, 235 Ill. App.3d
1036, 1046, 601 N.E.2d 1294, 1300 (App. Ct.2d Dist.
1992), the Second District Appellate Court embraced
as an authoritative explanation of the scope of the
Title VII exclusion the Joint Explanatory Statement of
Managers who drafted that exclusion. That same
statement has been relied on by the FirstTM, Second17
1~ EEOC v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at
55-56 (quoting Joint Explanatory Statement).
17 Butler, 211 F.3d at 747 (quoting Joint Explanatory
Statement).
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and Tenth Circuits.TM The Illinois Appellate Court
emphasized that that Joint Explanatory Statement
limited the federal statutory policymaking exclusion
to "positions at the highest levels ... such as cabinet
officers." Id. Lake County specifically relied on the
"narrow" interpretation of the federal statutory
exclusion adopted by the First Circuit in EEOC v.
State of Vermont and the Eighth Circuit in Goodwin
v. Circuit Court. 235 Ill. App.2d at 1045-46. Thus if a
Title VII or ADEA claim were brought in one of the
northern Illinois counties encompassed in that state’s
Second District, the state courts would apply the
majority rule narrowly construing the statutory
policymaker exclusion to include only appointees "at
the highest level." On the other hand, the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in
which those counties are located, would apply the
very different Seventh Circuit standard.TM Thus one
legal standard applies to ADEA or Title VII claims in
the federal courthouse in Rockford, Illinois, while a
different standard applies to such claims only three
blocks away at the Winnebago County courthouse.
1~ Anderson, 690 F.2d at 800 (quoting Joint Explanatory
Statement).
19 In Stone v. Pepmeyer, 2008 WL 879553 (C.D.Ill. 2008), the
Federal District Court, bound as it was by that Seventh Circuit
standard, refused to follow the state court decision in Lake
County, emphasizing that "this Court is not ... a part of the
Illinois state courts." 2008 WL 879553 at "1.
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C. This Conflict Is Widely Recognized
The Seventh Circuit has expressly rejected the
standard in the Second and other circuits. (Pet. App.
6a-7a). The Second Circuit in turn has disapproved
the Seventh Circuit standard. See pp. 19-20, supra.
The District Courts have repeatedly recognized
this conflict. In Levin v. Madigan, 2008 WL 4287778
(N.D.Ill. Sept. 12, 2008), the court described the
conflict between the Seventh Circuit standard in
Americanos and the Second and Tenth Circuit deci-
sions in Tranello and Anderson, respectively.
Plaintiff notes that some courts ... have con-
sidered whether plaintiffs actually had an
immediate working relationship with an
elected official. See, e.g., Tranello v. Frey ... ;
Anderson v. City of Albuquerque ...
This court’s analysis of the exemption from
coverage of Title VII and the ADEA for "poli-
cy making" positions, however, is governed
by the Seventh Circuit’s holding in America-
nos .... Rather than requiring the plaintiff to
have a close advisory relationship with an
elected official, as some other circuits do, the
Seventh Circuit held in Americanos that a
Deputy Attorney General fell within the ex-
emption ... because he could give input into
governmental decisions.
2008 WL 4287778 at *2-*3. The District Court judge
in Bervid v. Alvarez, 647 F.Supp.2d 1006 (N.D.Ill.
2009), who was also the District judge in Opp, ex-
pressly endorsed Levin’s rejection of the Second
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Circuit decision in Tranello as inconsistent with the
Seventh Circuit decision in Americanos.2° Stone v.
Pepmeyer, 2008 WL 879553 (C.D.Ill. 2008) also reject-
ed the Second Circuit decision in Butler as contrary to
Seventh Circuit precedent.
Plaintiffs note the Seventh Circuit decisions
in Livas v. Petka ... and Americanos v. Carter
... which were relied on by the Magistrate
Judge in making his recommendation. Plain-
tiffs then cite Butler v. New York State Dept.
of Law ... for its criticism of the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s rationale in Livas and suggest that
Americanos can be disregarded because it
failed to specifically consider Lake County.
However, this Court is not in the Second Cir-
cult or a part of the Illinois state courts, and
this is a hierarchical system. The Court is
not at liberty to ignore established law in the
Seventh Circuit because another circuit ...
reached a different result.
2008 WL 879553 at "1. Similarly, the District Court
in O’Neill v. Indiana Commission on Public Records,
149 F.Supp.2d 582, 589 n.8 (S.D.Ind. 2001), noted
that "[i]n Butler ... the Second Circuit recognized that
the Seventh Circuit, unlike the Second, applied the
20 647 F.Supp.2d at 1010 ("Plaintiff urges me to adopt ... the
Second Circuit’s analysis in Tranello ....Levin ... explicitly
declined to apply Tranello’s analysis to the question of whether
the plaintiff in that case held a ’policymaking’ position, noting
that Americanos governs the issue in this circuit").
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Elrod test in the context of whether or not an em-
ployee was a policymaker."
Conversely, district courts outside the Seventh
Circuit have rejected that circuit’s standard as incon-
sistent with precedent in their own circuits.
Some Circuits hold th[e] constitutional ex-
emption is congruent with exemptions under
statutes such as Title VII. See Americanos v.
Carter .... [T]he Second Circuit has declined
to use the same test for both the Elrod ex-
emption and ... the statutory exemption [re-
garding policymaking officials], Butler v.
New York State Dept. of Law ....
Bland v. New York, 263 F.Supp.2d 526, 541 (E.D.N.Y.
2003). Gomez v. City of Eagle Pass, 91 F.Supp.2d 1000
(W.D.Tex. 2000) observed that
[s]ome circuits have held that the test for ex-
emption under the Title VII definition of em-
ployee and the test for excepting some
policymakers from full First Amendment
protection are identical. See Americanos v.
Carter .... In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has
interpreted that Branti exception for policy-
making employees to require close considera-
tion of the content of the employment and
the actual or potential disruption to the
workplace relationship - factors arguably not
relevant to the Title VII exception inquiry.
91 F.Supp.2d at 1005 n.2.
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In the litigation below, the defendants them-
selves correctly recognized that the Seventh Circuit
standard conflicted with the standard in the Second
Circuit.
The Second Circuit’s approach should not be
followed. Plaintiffs assert that this Court’s
use of the political patronage analysis in de-
termining employee exemptions under the
ADEA "has been criticized for rendering im-
proper results" .... Plaintiffs cite to one case
from the Second Circuit, Butler v. New York
State Department of Law .... But the Butler
court declined to follow the Seventh Circuit’s
approach in applying the [Elrod/Branti] test
to determine if the plaintiff’s position was
exempt under Title VII .... This Court should
not adopt the Second Circuit’s test used to
analyze ADEA or Title VII claims. It is incor-
rect .... [T]his Court should reject the Plain-
tiffs’ suggestions that it follow the Second
Circuit, and should not modify its approach
to determining whether a position is on the
policy-making level.
Brief of Defendant Appellees, Opp v. Office of the
State’s Attorney of Cook County, at 12-16 (emphasis
omitted).
These circuit conflicts regarding the meaning of
the "policymaking level" exemption pose a significant
administrative problem for the EEOC, whose regional
offices often span several circuits. For example, the
Commission’s St. Louis office includes southern
Illinois (in the Seventh Circuit), Oklahoma and
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Kansas (in the Tenth Circuit) and Missouri and
Nebraska (in the Eighth Circuit). The conflict regard-
ing the scope of the exemption requires such a re-
gional office to handle EEOC charges differently
depending on the circuit in which a particular claim
arose.
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S UNIQUELY
BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE POL-
ICYMAKING LEVEL APPOINTEE EXCLU-
SION IS CLEARLY INCORRECT
A. The Statutory Exclusion Standard Is
Not The Same As The First Amendment
Exception Under Elrod and Branti
The linchpin of the Seventh Circuit precedent,
and of its decision in the instant case, is the holding
that the standard for determining whether an ap-
pointee is at the "policymaking level" under the
ADEA and similarly worded federal statutes should
be the standard for determining under Elrod and
Branti whether the First Amendment would permit
dismissal of that employee based on party affiliation.
That premise is manifestly incorrect.
The text and purpose of the statutory exclusion
are entirely different than the text of the First
Amendment and the purpose of the holding in Elrod
and Branti that certain government positions can be
filled on the basis of party affiliation. When Congress
added the first of these statutory exclusions to Title
VII in 1972, and then included such an exclusion in
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the ADEA in 1974, it could not have intended to
incorporate by reference the constitutional rule in
Elrod and Branti, which were not decided until 1976
and 1980, respectively.
The Seventh Circuit insists the term "policymak-
er" must have the same meaning under the statutory
exclusion as it does under the Elrod/Branti exception.
"We choose ... not to draw a distinction between how
aggrieved individuals are interpreted as policymaker
under the First Amendment and under the ADEA."
(Pet. App. 7a). But in Branti this Court made clear
that the availability of the First Amendment protec-
tion from politically-based dismissals does not turn on
whether the employee in question was (or on any
definition of) a "policymaker." Rather, Branti ex-
plained, the controlling issue is whether "an employ-
ee’s private political beliefs would interfere with the
discharge of his public duties." 445 U.S. at 517.
[T]he ultimate inquiry is not whether the la-
bel "policymaker" ... fits a particular position;
rather the question is whether the hiring au-
thority can demonstrate that party affiliation
is an appropriate requirement for the effec-
tive performance of the public office involved.
445 U.S. at 518.
It is ... clear that party affiliation is not nec-
essarily relevant to every policymaking ...
position. The coach of a state university’s
football team formulates policy, but no one
could seriously claim that Republicans make
better coaches than Democrats, or vice versa.
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445 U.S. at 518. Under Branti there simply is no
First Amendment "policymaker" standard that could
be used to define the term "policymaking" in the
ADEA and other statutes.
The purpose of the First Amendment exception
is fundamentally different from the purpose of the
statutory exemption. The constitutional exception
rests on a recognition that there are some govern-
ment positions for which party affiliation is a rele-
vant job requirement. The ADEA policymaking level
exclusion, on the other hand, assuredly does not rest
on the view that employees under 40 are better
policymakers than more senior workers. The ADEA
contains an express provision that in some circum-
stances permits the use of age if it is a bona fide
occupational qualification. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). This
provision, however, requires an employer to adduce
persuasive job-specific evidence that age is a neces-
sary job requirement for a particular position. The
defendants in this case do not assert that they could
meet that statutory standard.
B. The Seventh Circuit Standard Is Incon-
sistent With The Language and Purpose
of The Statutory Exclusion
The Seventh Circuit standard is in several fun-
damental respects inconsistent with the language
and purpose of the statutory exclusion for policymak-
ing level appointees.
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(1) The Seventh Circuit standard treats an
exercise of discretion by a government official as
policymaking. (See p. 14, supra). But this Court has
made clear that a mere exercise of discretion is not
the same as policymaking. "[A] County Sheriff may
have discretion to hire and fire employees without
also being the county official responsible for estab-
lishing county employment policy." Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 n.12 (1986). Thus "if
county employment policy was set by the Board of
Commissioners," the Sheriff would not make policy
"even if the Board left the Sheriff discretion to hire
and fire employees." Id. "Simply going along with
discretionary decisions made by one’s subordinates ...
is not a delegation to them of the authority to make
policy." City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,
129 (1988).
Under the Seventh Circuit standard an official is
at the "policymaking level" if he or she merely has
input into policy decisions, a requirement that is
satisfied regardless of whether that input has any
impact on the ultimate policy. That expansive view is
contrary to the language of the statute, which refers
to "policymaking" not policy influencing. Lobbyists,
for example, routinely have "input" into policy deci-
sions; no one would on that basis refer to a lobbyist as
a government policymaker.
In the Seventh Circuit an appointee who never
actually makes policy or even has input into policy is
still within the exemption if higher officials could
assign the appointee some policymaking task. But
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section ll(f) applies only if an appointee "on" the
policymaking level, not to an appointee who merely
could be at (but is not actually "on") that level if his or
her superiors were to decide to assign such responsi-
bilities.
(2) The Seventh Circuit’s sweeping interpreta-
tion of the policymaking appointee exception is incon-
sistent with all of the opinions in Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991). Gregory held that appointed
state judges are not employees within the meaning of
the ADEA, and can thus be subject to a mandatory
retirement provision. The majority characterized
section 630(f) as excluding "all elected and most high-
ranking government officials." 501 U.S. at 465 (em-
phasis added).21 Justice White, who evaluated section
630(f) in greater detail, reasoned that policymaking is
the creation of standards "to guide and determine
present and future decisions." 501 U.S. at 482. The
legislative history of the Title VII policymaking level
exemption, Justice White noted, clearly evinced an
intent to limit "policymaking" to the "highest levels"
of the relevant government body, and to "limit the
exception ’down the chain of command.’" 501 U.S. at
485 (quoting EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 56.)
21 The majority opinion did not analyze in detail the policy-
making level exclusion in section 630(f); it concluded, rather,
that the ambiguity in that provision was dispositive because
"[w]e will not read the ADEA to cover state judges unless
Congress has made it clear that judges are included." 501 U.S.
at 466 (emphasis in original).
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Justice Blackmun would have limited the policymak-
ing exception to individuals who "work closely with
the appointing official." 501 U.S. at 489. The Seventh
Circuit standard, which treats as at the policymaking
level every one of the thousands of prosecutors in
Illinois, clearly is inconsistent with all of these formu-
lations.
(3) Section 11(f) of the ADEA, enacted in 1974,
was taken essentially verbatim from section 701(f) of
Title VII, which was itself adopted in 1972. Although
section 11(f) itself has no relevant legislative history,
the legislative history of section 701(f) is quite specific
and authoritative. The lower courts have correctly
looked to the legislative history of section 701(f) of
Title VII in construing section 11(f) of the ADEA.
The Report of the Conference Committee that
wrote section 701(f) made emphatically clear that the
statutory exclusion was to apply to only a limited
number of high ranking officials.
The exemption extends to persons chosen by
such officials to be on their personal staffs,
appointees of such officials on the highest
policymaking levels such as cabinet members
or other immediate advisors of such elected
officials with respect to the exercise of the
Constitutional or legal powers of the office
held by such elected officer .... This exemption
is intended to be construed very narrowly
and is in no way intended to establish an
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overall narrowing of the expanded coverage
of State and local government employees .... 22
A separate Joint Explanatory Statement of Managers
at The Conference on H.R. 1746 described the provi-
sion in similar terms
It is the intention of the conferees to exempt
elected officials and ... persons appointed by
such elected officials ... to policymaking posi-
tions at the highest levels of the departments
or agencies of State or local governments,
such as cabinet officers, and persons with
comparable responsibilities at the local level.
It is the conferees[’] intent that this exemp-
tion shall be construed narrowly.
Joint Explanatory Statement of Managers at the
Conference on H.R. 1746, reprinted in part in 1972
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 2137, 2179, 2180
(1972) (emphasis added).
(4) The EEOC has long insisted that the poli-
cymaking level exclusion in section 701(f) of Title VII
is limited to policymaking positions "at the highest
levels of a department or agency of a state or political
subdivision of a state." EEOC Dec. 78-42, 1978 WL
5794 (EEOC) at *2.
The legislative history ... states that the in-
tent of Congress was that the exemptions in
Section 701(f) be narrowly construed ....
52 The Conference Report is set out at 118 Cong. Rec. 7166-
67.
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In exempting policy-making employees, Con-
gress realized the necessity of allowing elected
officials complete freedom in appointing
those who would direct state and local de-
partments and agencies. These individuals
must work closely with elected officials and
their advisers in developing policies that will
implement the overall goals of the elected of-
ficials ....
The House-Senate Conference Committee,
which developed the final language found in
the Act, clearly documents that Congress in-
tended that portion of Section 701(f) which
exempts appointees on the policy-making
level should exempt only policy-making
officials on the highest levels of state or local
government.
1978 WL 5794 at "1.23
The Seventh Circuit decision in the instant case
has produced precisely the result which Congress
emphatically sought to avoid. As the text of sections
11(f) and 701(f) makes clear, and as the legislative
history of section 701(f) emphasizes, the purpose of
the policymaking level exclusion was only to exempt
the handful of deputies that serve immediately under
an elected official. The Seventh Circuit thus has
clearly erred in construing the statutory exclusion so
broadly that all of the 900 lawyers appointed by an
23 The identical construction of section 701(f) is set out in
EEOC Decision No. 79-8, 1978 WL 5829 (EEOC).
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elected prosecutor, literally the entire legal staff of
that large office, are outside the protections of the
ADEA and Title VII.
III. THIS CASE IS AN EXCELLENT VEHICLE
FOR RESOLVING THIS CIRCUIT CONFLICT
This case presents an ideal vehicle for resolving
the circuit conflict regarding the scope of the policy-
making level exclusion in the ADEA, Title VII, and
other major federal employment statutes.
This appeal presents a pure question of law,
unencumbered by any factual disputes. The com-
plaints were dismissed by the courts below under
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. The motions were not supported
by any affidavits or other factual material; the de-
fendants simply advanced the straightforward legal
contention that under the Seventh Circuit’s uniquely
broad interpretation of the statutory exclusion all
assistant state’s attorneys are appointees at the
"policymaking level." The defendants have consistently
argued, as the court below held, that the actual work
performed by any of the plaintiffs (or any other
lawyer in the office) is under that standard irrelevant
to whether he or she is excluded from the protections
of the ADEA.
The difference between the Seventh Circuit
standard and the standards in the First, Second and
Tenth Circuits is clearly of controlling importance.
The defendants do not claim that the plaintiffs were
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"high level" officials in the State’s Attorney’s Office or
that they worked closely (or at all) with the State’s
Attorney, as required in the First, Second and Tenth
Circuits. Similarly, the defendants have never assert-
ed that any of the plaintiffs had the authority to
engage in the sort of prospective rulemaking that
would satisfy the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
interpretation of the policymaking level exclusion. If,
as four other circuits have held, the policymaking
level exclusion is indeed to be construed narrowly, it
assuredly could not encompass every one of the more
than 900 attorneys who work in the Cook County
State’s Attorney’s Office.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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